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‘The reasonableness approach of the South African Constitutional Court – 
making the constitutional right of access to housing “real” or effectively 
meaningless?’ 
Dr Pia A. Lange 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Unlike most constitutions, the South African Constitution1 explicitly provides a 
justiciable right of access to housing.2 In fact, South Africa is one of a few countries 
in which socio-economic rights are placed on equal terms with their civil and political 
counterparts and in which courts are given the power of judicial review of legislation 
and executive policies are taken in that regard.3 The constitutional inclusion of a right 
of access to housing as well as other social and economic rights was based on their 
potential to both reintegrate the formerly excluded citizens of South Africa within the 
new post-Apartheid nation and to overcome the denial of rights that was legacy of 
Apartheid.4 
The relevant provision is section 26(1), which states that ‘everyone has the right 
to have access to adequate housing’. This statement is then tempered by section 26(2), 
which requires that: ‘the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources to achieve progressive realisation of this right.’ The third 
paragraph of section 26 of the Constitution provides a safeguard against arbitrary 
evictions. 
Due to the exceptional circumstance of a justiciable constitutional guarantee, but 
especially because of the judicial enforcement of the right of access to housing by the 
Constitutional Court in the seminal Grootboom case5, South Africa has gained 
international recognition in terms of the justiciability of socio-economic rights. In the 
Grootboom case, the plaintiff, Mrs Irene Grootboom and other members of her 
community challenged the forced ‘reminiscent of apartheid-style’6 eviction of her 
community from their previous informal settlements. At the time of the application to 
the Court, the community of 390 adults and 510 children was forced to live on a sports 
                                                          
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (henceforth ‘the Constitution’). 
2 Section 26 of the Constitution. 
3 Section 167 (4) and (5), 169 (a) and 172 of the Constitution. 
4 Albie Sachs ‘Social and Economic Rights: Can they be made justiciable’ (2000) 53 SMU Law Review 
1381-84. 
5 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (‘Grootboom’). 
6 Ibid para 10. 
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field, with nothing other than plastic sheeting to protect them from the elements.7 They 
instituted legal action against the government, demanding that the municipality fulfils 
its constitutional obligations laid down in Section 26 of the Constitution towards them, 
which they claimed would involve the provision of at least basic shelter. The High 
Court granted relieve to some of the plaintiffs. However, the government appealed 
against this decision to the Constitutional Court, arguing that the Constitution did not 
require the government actually to provide shelter. 
In its judgment, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the right of access to 
housing creates both negative8 and positive9 obligations for the state. Regarding the 
latter, the state is obliged: (a) to take reasonable legislative and other measures; (b) 
within its available resources; (c) to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.10 
While progressive realisation was given the same purport as under Article 11 para 1 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights11 (ICESCR),12 
the Court did not adopt the concept of minimum core obligations into the South 
African Constitution which is used for the interpretation of socio-economic rights 
under the ICESCR.13 Instead, the Constitutional Court – based on the text of the 
provision of section 26(2) of the Constitution – used the test of reasonableness to 
consider whether the state had fulfilled its positive obligations to take appropriate steps 
to insure the right of access to housing.14 According to the Court, the test of 
reasonableness measures both the state’s plan and the implementation of this plan.15 
Furthermore, the reasonableness of state actions in relation to the duty to provide 
access to housing has to be considered in its social, economic and historical context.16 
Thereby, the availability of resources is an important factor in determining what is 
reasonable.17 Within this framework, the Court declared the government’s housing 
                                                          
7 Grootboom and others v Oostenberg Municipality et al 1999 (Case no 6826/99) High Court of South 
Africa (Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division) page 5-6. 
8 Grootboom supra note 5 paras 20 and 34. 
9 Ibid para 38. 
10 Ibid. 
11 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into 
force 3 January 1976). 
12 Grootboom supra note 5 para 45. 
13 Ibid para 33. 
14 Ibid paras 38-44. 
15 Ibid para 42. 
16 Ibid para 43. 
17 Ibid para 46. 
3 
 
programme unreasonable in that it had failed to provide shelter for the most needy 
such as Mrs Grootboom and her community.18 
Grootboom and the subsequent cases on socio-economic rights are guided by this 
‘reasonableness’ approach that has polarised opinion both within and beyond South 
Africa. Early responses to Grootboom were positive and the judgment remains widely 
regarded as a remarkable victory for the enforcement of socio-economic rights.19 
However, in the ensuing years, the reasonableness approach has had its share of 
critics,20 perhaps attributable to the fact that Mrs Grootboom died in 2008 only in her 
40s and still housed in an inadequate shack despite the judgment won in her name. 
The most common criticism of the jurisprudence is that the reasonableness approach 
leads to a lack of normative content or an “emptiness” of the right of access to 
housing.21 The individual has a right, but only a right to demand that the state takes 
action to begin to address the housing needs of those individuals who cannot provide 
for themselves or who need assistance from the state before they would be able to gain 
access to adequate housing.22 Contrary to the minimum core concept, the 
reasonableness approach shifts the emphasis from the reasonableness of the solution 
to the reasonableness of the steps taken, moving away from a substantive right towards 
administrative oversight,23 which makes – so the assumption goes – the constitutional 
right of access to housing effectively meaningless. 
However, in this dissertation I will argue that it is not the reasonableness approach 
per se which hinders the implementation of the right of access to housing but rather 
the choice of remedy and the lack of (individual) access to the Court. In doing so, I 
will first show – as a precondition of my argument – that the Court by using the 
reasonableness approach is acting in accordance with the wording and the 
transformative character of the South African Constitution and its own institutional 
                                                          
18 Ibid para 69. 
19 Cass R. Sunstein ‘Social and Economic rights? Lessons from South Africa’ (2001) 11 Constitutional 
Forum 123; Jeanne M. Woods ‘Justiciable Social Rights as a Critique of the Liberal Paradigm’ (2003) 
38 Texas International Law Journal 763, 785-86; Pierre de Vos ‘Grootboom, The right of Access to 
Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness’ (2001) 17 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 271. 
20 Danie Brand ‘The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence or 
“What are Socio-Economic Rights for?”’ in Henk Botha et al. (eds) Rights and Democracy in a 
Transformative Constitution (2003) 33; David Bilchitz ‘Towards a Reasonable Approach to the 
Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for Future Socioeconomic Rights Jurisprudence (2003) 19 S. 
Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 1; Marius Pieterse ‘Eating Socioeconomic Rights: The Usefulness of Rights Talk 
in Alleviating Social Hardship Revisited’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 796. 
21 David Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 159-62. 
22 Grootboom supra note 5 paras 94-95. 
23 Jessie Hohmann The Right to Housing (2014) 102; Danie Brand op cit note 20, 33. 
4 
 
role within the constitutional framework based on the separation of powers. Only 
afterwards, I will demonstrate that the effectiveness of the right of access to housing 
rather depends on the remedy granted by the Court and the possibility of access to the 
Court rather than on the approach reverted to by the Court. 
The focus of the dissertation will thereby be only on the positive obligations that 
flow from the right of access to housing and not on the enforcement of negative duties, 
including those associated with Section 26(3) of the Constitution through the concept 
of meaningful engagement.24 
The outline of the dissertation is organized as follows: As the Constitutional Court 
in Grootboom compared the constitutional right of access to housing with Article 11 
para 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) and its interpretation, the following chapter (II.) of the dissertation briefly 
introduces the right to housing under the ICESCR and most notably the ‘minimum 
core approach’ developed through the General Comments of the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as the standard against which 
other standards for the enforcement of socio-economic rights are measured. In the next 
chapter (III.) I will summarise the highly controversial and contested implementation 
of the right of access to housing and other socio-economic rights as justiciable rights 
in the South African Constitution, before analysing in the main chapter (IV.) the 
Grootboom case and the application of the test of reasonableness. By dealing with the 
critics of the judgment, this chapter will also address the question whether the 
reasonableness approach is in accordance with the separation of powers doctrine and 
the transformative character of the Constitution. In the following the study will have 
a look beyond Grootboom and examine what is hindering the judicial enforceability 
of the right of access to housing. Finally, the dissertation will conclude with whether 
the reasonableness approach of the South African Constitutional Court is making the 




                                                          
24 Occupiers of 51 Oliva Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg and Others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC). 
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II. THE RIGHT TO HOUSING UNDER THE ICESCR AND THE MINIMUM 
CORE CONCEPT 
The right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and 
housing, can be found in Article 11 para 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the treaty – together with the international 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)25 and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR)26 – collectively known as the International Bill of Rights.27 
Article 11 para 1 states: 
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The 
States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, 
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based 
on free consent. 
 
Although there are several other international instruments which address the 
different dimensions of the right to adequate housing as well,28 Article 11 para 1 of 
the ICESCR can be considered to be the most comprehensive and perhaps the most 
important of the relevant provisions.29 The wording and the structure of Article 11 
para 1 of the ICESCR is clearly inspired by Article 25 of the UDHR. However, while 
the UDHR envisages the right to housing as one aspect of the right to an adequate 
standard of living, Article 11 para 1 of the ICESCR has been interpreted in a way that 
differentiates between the separate elements of the adequate standard of living. Under 
                                                          
25 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 UNTS 14668, adopted on 
16 December 1966. 
26 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 
217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. 
27 Katie Boyle ‘Reconceptualising socio-economic rights in the transitional justice discipline’ (2016) 2 
Law, Social Justice & Global Development 2. 
28 See, for example, Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 5 (e) 
(iii) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) or Article 14 
(2) (h) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
29 Matthew C. R. Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1995) 
330; Scott Leckie ‘The Right to Housing’ in Asbjørn Eide & Catarina Krause & Allan Rosas (eds) 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2001) 153; United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, The Right to Adequate Housing (Article 11 para 1): Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights General Comment 4 (1991) E/1992/23 para 3. 
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the ICESCR the right to housing occurs as a separate right which ‘is thus derived from 
the right to an adequate standard of living’.30 
The understanding of the content of the right to adequate housing and the other 
socio-economic rights in the Covenant has been largely developed by the United 
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘the Committee’), the 
body in charge of monitoring the implementation of the ICESCR which was created 
in 1985.31 The Committee has released a number of General Comments that attempt 
to give content to the rights recognized in the Covenant and to assist the states parties 
in fulfilling their obligations.32 While the Committee’s General Comments are non-
binding, they still have been highly influential in creating a common international 
understanding of the content of socio-economic rights.33 
The interpretation of the right to adequate housing is set out in General Comment 
No. 4, which was adopted by the end of 1991.34 In this Comment, the Committee not 
only emphasizes that the right involves more than shelter, but – linking the right to 
adequate housing to human dignity – should be seen as a place to live somewhere in 
security, peace and dignity.35 Moreover, it stresses that the reference in Article 11 para 
1 of the Covenant must be read as referring not just to housing but to adequate 
housing.36 Being ‘well aware that adequacy is determined in part by social, economic, 
cultural, climatic, ecological and other factors’, the Committee ‘still believes that it is 
nevertheless possible to identify certain aspects of the right that must be taken into 
account for this purpose in any particular context’.37 These aspects that constitute the 
fundamentals of adequate housing are: (1) legal security of tenure; (2) availability of 
                                                          
30 General Comment No. 4 supra note 29 para 1. 
31 UN Economic and Social Council Res 1985/17 ‘Review of the composition, organisation and 
administrative arrangements of the Sessional Working Group of Governmental Experts on the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (28 May 1985) 
UN Doc S/RES/985/17. For the establishment and the composition of the Committee in detail see 
Matthew C. R. Craven op cit note 29, 35-105. 
32 Yuval Shany ‘Stuck in a Moment of Time: The International Justiciability of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ in Daphne Barak-Erez and Aeyal M Gross (eds) Exploring Social Rights, Between 
Theory and Practice (2007) 83-85. 
33 Matthew C. R. Craven op cit note 29, 91 attributes them a ‘considerable legal weight’. 
34 General Comment No. 4 supra note 29. See also General Comment No. 7 which is dealing with forced 
evictions. United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Right to Adequate 
Housing: Forced Evictions (Article 11 para 1): Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
General Comment 7 (1997) E/1998/22. Annex IV. 
35 General Comment No. 4 supra note 29 para 7. 
36 Ibid. 
37 General Comment No. 4 supra note 29 para 8. 
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materials, facilities and infrastructure; (3) affordability; (4) habitability; (5) 
accessibility; (6) location; and (7) cultural adequacy.38 
Each one of these elements are further defined in the Comment39 and these 
definitions – determining the scope and content of the obligations imposed by the right 
– are, of course, highly debatable.40 For the purposes of this dissertation, however, it 
is not necessary to further engage with the content of these definitions in detail. It is 
decisive that the approach of the Committee provides some content to the right to 
housing in the first place rather than looking at the exact details of this content. 
According to the Committee, each one of the stated elements, must be present in order 
to enjoy the right to adequate housing. The Committees’ approach is therefore to 
define adequacy through the realisation of the seven elements rather than to consider 
the concept of adequacy itself in any depth. Put differently, fulfilment of the 
requirements set out, will produce adequate housing.41 This approach has found some 
critics: By suggesting that adequate housing might be realisable through the seven 
elements, so the complaint goes, the Committee oversimplifies the not straightforward 
concept of adequacy.42 This might lead to some shortcomings in the objection to 
achieve adequate housing.43 Nevertheless, despite this alleged weakness of the 
Committees approach, it offers the states parties a practical way to fulfil their 
obligations in respect of Article 11 para 1 of the Covenant. It is not without reason that 
General Comment No. 4 is considered to be ‘the single most authoritative legal 
interpretation of what the right to housing actually means in legal terms under 
international law.’44 
However, the so defined right to housing in Article 11 para 1 of the ICESCR is 
not absolute in nature, which makes the definition of the right and the obligations that 
it imposes on states even more intricate. First, as can easily be inferred from the 
wording of Article 11 para 1, the provision includes an internal limitation as it only 
obliges the States Parties to ‘take appropriate steps to ensure its realization of this 
right’, in concert with other states based on voluntary international cooperation. 
                                                          
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 See Jessie Hohmann op cit note 23, 21-29. 
41 Ibid at 21. 
42 Ibid 21-29. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, Sources 4: Legal Resources for Housing Rights: 
International and National Standards, 2nd ed (2000) 73. 
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Secondly, the right to adequate housing is shaped by the general definition of the 
nature of the obligations undertaken by states parties to the Covenant described in 
Article 2 para 1, a provision specifically drafted to reflect the need of states to allow 
for greater flexibility in the fulfilment of the rights of the Covenant45: 
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
Again, guidance to the interpretation of this ‘convoluted’ and ‘intractable’ 
provision46 is offered by a statement of the Committee.47 ‘General Comment No. 3: 
The Nature of States Parties Obligations’48 contains the general principles upon which 
state action should be based. First it clarifies that a state needs only to ‘take steps’ but 
these steps must aim towards the progressive realisation of the right.49 After the 
Covenant’s entry into force for the state concerned, steps towards this goal must be 
taken within a reasonably (short) time.50 ‘Such steps should be deliberate, concrete 
and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in the 
Covenant’.51 They should be as ‘expeditiously and effectively as possible’.52 The 
Covenant thus creates a duty to ‘move forward’. All deliberate regressive steps would 
compromise this obligation to move forward on the realisation of the rights. The 
Covenant thus also creates an obligation to avoid deliberately retrogressive measures 
(concept of non-retrogression).53 This does not mean that any deliberate regressive 
steps are tantamount with a violation of the Covenant, but ‘[a]ny deliberately 
retrogressive measures […] would require the most careful consideration and would 
                                                          
45 Matthew C. R. Craven op cit note 29, 114. 
46 Ibid at 115. 
47 For the interpretation of the nature and the scope of the party obligations see also ‘The Limburg 
Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Social, Social and Cultural Rights’ 
(1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 122 and Theo C. Van Boven & Cees Flinterman & Ingrid Westendorp 
(eds) The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1989). 
48 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Nature of States Parties 
Obligations (Article 2 para 1): Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 
3 (1990) E/1991/23. 
49 Ibid para 2. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid para 9. 
53 David Bilchitz op cit note 21, 184. 
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need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the 
Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources.’54 
Besides the obligation to take steps ‘by all appropriate means’, the Committee has 
adopted, perhaps most importantly, what is termed the “minimum core concept to 
socio-economic rights”.55 The Committee found that a ‘minimum core obligation to 
ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the 
rights is incumbent upon every State party’.56 Any failure of a state party to provide 
at least this minimum core is prima facie a violation of the rights.57 For example, ‘a 
State party in which a significant number of individuals deprived […] of basic shelter 
and housing […] is, prima facie failing to discharge its obligations under the 
Covenant.’58 According to the minimum core principle, every right should be at least 
realised to the extent that provides for the basic needs of every member of the 
society.59 
However, the minimum core obligation is not irrespective of resource 
considerations: ‘any assessment as to whether a State has discharged its minimum core 
obligation must […] take account of resource constraints applying within the country 
concerned.’60 Hence, the state’s availability of financial resources limits the minimum 
core obligation under Article 2 para 1 of the ICESCR. Even so, Article 2 para 1 does 
not intend to provide a mechanism for states to abrogate responsibility for the 
implementation of socio-economic rights.61 The Committee stresses that the 
limitations of Article 2 ‘must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the 
raison d’être, of the Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States parties 
in respect of the full realization of the rights in question’.62 Accordingly, if a State 
                                                          
54 Ibid. See also United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Right to 
Social Security (Article 9) General Comment 19 (2008) E/C.12/GC/19 para. 43. 
55 There are a lot of complexities associated with this concept, starting with the terminology: In the 
following the term ‚minimum core concept‘ and ‘minimum core obligation‘ are used synonymously. 
However, one can use the phrases with a somewhat different meaning. While the minimum core content 
is often defined as the nature or essence of a right, the term minimum state obligations focuses on the 
question what things must a state immediately do to realise the right. See Sage Russell ‘Minimum State 
Obligations: International Dimensions’ in Danie Brand & Sage Russell (eds) Exploring the core content 
of socio-economic rights: South Africa and international perspectives (2002) 14-15. 
56 General Comment No. 3 supra note 48 para 10. 
57 Ibid; Pierre de Vos ‘Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights?: Social and Economic 
Rights In South Africa’s 1996 Constitution‘ (1997) 13 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 98. 
58 General Comment No. 3 supra note 48 para 10. 
59 Matthew C. R. Craven op cit note 29, 141. 
60 General Comment No. 3 supra note 48 para 10. 
61 Jessie Hohmann op cit note 23, 19. 
62 General Comment No. 3 supra note 48 para 9. 
10 
 
party is not able ‘to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available 
resources, it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that 
are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum 
obligations.’63 In paragraph 11 the Comment goes on to state that ‘[t]he Committee 
wishes to emphasize, however, that even where the available resources are 
demonstrably inadequate, the obligation remains for a State party to strive to ensure 
the widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing 
circumstances’.64 Thus, the burden of proof rests with the member state if it claims 
that it cannot meet even the most minimal obligations.65 The Comment ‘must be read 
as establishing a “presumption of guilt” independent of resource considerations.’66 In 
later General Comments on other rights, the Committee has even adopted a less 
flexible position by insisting that the non-fulfilment of core obligations cannot be 
justified under any circumstances.67 
For the introduction of the minimum core concept, the Committee quotes two 
reasons: First of all, it mentions that it became aware of the necessity of the recognition 
of minimum core because of its experience in examining the reports of states 
concerning their compliance with the Covenant. Secondly, the Committee argues that 
the Covenant would be largely deprived of its raison d’être, if it would not at least 
establish a minimum core obligation.68 
This explanation69 and the concept itself can certainly be considered 
problematic.70 Regarding the concept itself, it is first and foremost questionable if it is 
possible to define a ‘minimum core’ for the right to housing and the other rights of the 
ICESCR that may be operated on an international level. The primary conceptual 
question for this purpose whether the standard of a minimum core is international or 
                                                          
63 Ibid para 10. 
64 Ibid para 11. 
65 Sage Russell op cit note 55, 16. Yuval Shany op cit note 32, 90. 
66 Matthew C. R. Craven op cit note 29, 143. 
67 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The right to the highest 
attainable standard of health (Article 12): Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General 
Comment 14 (2000) E/C.12/2000 para 47 and United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, The right to water (Articles 11 and 12): Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights General Comment 15 (2002) E/C.12/2002/11 para 40. 
68 General Comment No. 3 supra note 48 para 10. 
69 Whether this explanation of the Committee for introducing the idea of a minimum core obligation is 
persuasive is discussed in detail by David Bilchitz op cit note 21, 185-191. 
70 Katharine G. Young ‘The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in the Search 




state-specific is still unanswered.71 Secondly, in placing the emphasis on ‘minimum’ 
core obligations the concept might be used by states and other relevant actors to take 
only the minimum steps associated by this concept rather than to work on the provision 
of adequate housing for everybody.72 What is more, the Committee will primarily 
direct its attention to the actions of developing States, leaving those beyond the reach 
who are facing material deprivation in the developed countries.73 The concentration 
on the minimum core might also distract from the fact that the responsibility for 
poverty and deprivation in the world lies not with the individual states alone but rather 
with the rules of international trade and the economic world order.74 Finally and more 
fundamental, doubts have been raised, if the standard of a ‘minimum core’ can supply 
any content to the rights under the ICESCR nor on a national level.75 
Despite these objections, the minimum core principle introduced by the 
Committee is still the standard against which the interpretation of the right to housing 
in other international and regional regimes and jurisdictions is measured. Whatever 
the scope and content of that concept exactly might be, at least it provides a clear 
understanding of the direction that the steps required by the state parties should follow. 
Unlike the reasonableness approach, it provides a degree to which the right to housing 
can be progressively realised or, metaphorically speaking, it provides a “minimum 
floor” of the socio-economic rights which – unless it can be shown not to be feasible 
– the states have a duty to address immediately.76 Irrespective of whether this 
minimum core concept should be operated on the basis of individualised judicial 
enforcement where individuals can immediately claim particular goods from the 
state,77 it offers a standard to measure governmental policy on substantive grounds.78 
Regarding the implementation of the right, even the richest countries regularly fail 
to provide the minimum core to their inhabitants.79 This failure can often be attributed 
to a lack of political will combined or in addition to a lack of resources as the 
                                                          
71 Katharine G. Young ibid at 114-15. 
72 Pierre de Vos ‘The Essential Components of the Human Right to Adequate Housing – a South African 
Perspective’ in Danie Brand & Sage Russell (eds) Exploring the core content of socio-economic rights: 
South Africa and international perspectives (2002) 33. 
73 Matthew C. R. Craven op cit note 29, 143-44. 
74 Ibid at 144. 
75 Katharine G. Young op cit note 70, 164-75. 
76 Pierre de Vos op cit note 72, 31. 
77 For this discussion see David Bilchitz op cit note 21, 203-206 and later in Chapter 4. 
78 Theunis Roux The Politics of Principle (2013) 397. 
79 Jessie Hohmann op cit note 23, 19. 
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implementation even of a minimum core could impose a heavy financial burden on a 
state. Furthermore, the insufficient implementation might also be attributed to the still 
existing distinction between socio-economic rights on the one hand and civil and 
politic rights on the other and the traditional and still shared interpretation of socio-
economic rights as non-enforceable rights linked to this distinction.80 
Finally, unlike the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
ICESCR was missing any kind of judicial oversight – at least in form of an individual 
or complaints mechanism – for a long time. On 10 December 2008, the adoption of a 
new international instrument, the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR81 – which was 
entered into force in 201382 – closed that legal protection gap by introducing an 
individual and collective communication mechanism, an inter-state communication 
procedure and an inquiry procedure.83 The Committee has been calling for an Optional 
Protocol for this purpose since the early 1990s.84 Despite the slow ratification process, 
the Optional Protocol eventually recognises the justiciability of economic, social and 
cultural rights in the international sphere and allows the Committee to refine the 
understanding of their content through interpreting their scope in the context of 
specific cases. 
However, the Committee has developed the minimum core concept without the 
jurisdiction to hear individual or collective complaints. And even under the Optional 
Protocol, the Committee, having examined an individual or collective complaint, can 
only transmit its non-legally binding ‘views on the communication, together with its 
recommendations, if any, to the parties concerned’.85 What is more, like other 
protocols appended to human rights treaties the Optional Protocol provides an opt-in 
mechanism which ensures that quasi-judicial supervision would not be imposed on 
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unwilling states. These circumstances and the specifics of international public law 
supervision in general should be kept in mind while examining the right to housing on 
a regional level.86 It should not diminish the outcomes of the Committee in developing 
the definition of a minimum core of the right to housing and other socio-economic 
rights, but the missing possibility of actual enforcement of a right should not be 
underestimated. As Yuval Shany pointed out, none of the party states has ever actively 
protested against the establishment of the General Comments of the Committee and 
the introduction of the minimum concept,87 yet the commitment to socio-economic 
rights does not take the states much effort as long as these rights are effectively not 
enforceable. 
 
III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF JUSTICIABLE SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA’S FINAL CONSTITUTION 
The inclusion of socio-economic rights as part of an enforceable Bill of Rights in a 
Constitution requires much more effort of the state concerned than the commitment to 
socio-economic rights as required under the Covenant. Therefore, the manner in which 
socio-economic rights or so called ‘second generation rights’88 should be included in 
South Africa’s final Constitution89 was heavily debated in public and in academic 
writing prior to and during the drafting process.90 
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Both parties to the argument posed the question as going to the very legitimacy of 
the bill of rights in particular and the constitution in general.91 For the proponents, the 
inclusion of socio-economic rights was essential as it only would put people in the 
position to exercise civil and political rights in the first place. They argued that at least 
a basic set of the most fundamental needs like food, water, shelter, health care and 
education must be secured, before one can even think about resorting to the ‘first 
generation rights’ traditionally protected in liberal constitutions. Without such basic 
resources political and civil rights cannot exist in a meaningful way as citizens would 
not be able to participate effectively in the democratic process.92 Put simply, it might 
be difficult to exercise the right to freedom of speech or the right to demonstrate for 
people who are starving. It has therefore been concluded that civil and political rights 
and economic and social rights are interdependent and indivisible.93 
According to the fears of the proponents of the inclusion, the constitution would 
hardly be considered as fundamental law if it would not recognize the pressing needs 
of the majority of the population.94 Only the guarantee of socio-economic rights could 
legitimise the new democratic order and would ensure that democratic 
constitutionalism is promoted within the country. Conversely, a bill of rights that 
solely contains civil and political rights would be perceived to be a “charter of 
luxuries” and therefore would discredit its recognition as a charter of fundamental 
values.95 A constitution without socio-economic rights could even be understood to 
be a document established in advance by a privileged white minority to defend the 
status quo, guarantee property rights and limit the capacity of a meaningful 
redistribution of wealth and thus amount to a “bill of whites” rather than a bill of 
rights.96 
This argument must be considered against the backdrop of the situation of the 
country during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Almost 90 percent of the country’s land 
area was reserved by law for whites only, including all the central business districts 
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and leafy suburbs.97 The state enforced racial separation which allowed for extensive 
accumulation of resources and power by a racially-defined minority what altogether 
led to a level and form of inequality and a lack of opportunity for the vast majority of 
the population incomparable to other countries.98 Furthermore, the extreme social 
inequality was a direct result of the State policies under Apartheid.99 Against this 
background, there was an urgent need for the new constitution to address and 
overcome the gross legacy of apartheid inter alia through the inclusion of socio-
economic rights.100 
The necessity to address the legacy of apartheid was not denied by the opponents 
of the inclusion, however, they did not believe that socio-economic rights were the 
right tool to legitimise the constitutional project.101 Quite to the contrary, they thought 
that the inclusion of economic and social rights in the bill of rights would bring the 
whole document into disrepute. Based on the assumption that socio-economic rights 
are unenforceable, they argued that their constitutional inclusion as part of the bill of 
rights would promise something which cannot be delivered. From their point of view, 
this could be seen as a form of “constitutional fraud”.102 To call something a legal 
‘right’ and consequently include it in a bill of rights, which in the end turns out to be 
unenforceable would undermine the law’s commitment to enforcing rights. Thereby, 
socio-economic rights would offset any ‘legitimation’ these rights confer and discredit 
the bill of rights as a whole.103 
The constitution should be honest regarding the satisfaction of the socio-economic 
needs of the population and treat them as political objectives rather than enforceable 
rights. Therefore, according to Dennis Davis,104 the only way to incorporate socio-
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economic ‘rights’ in the constitution would be as directive principles as it has been 
done, for instance, in India, Namibia or Ireland.105 These directives of state policy can 
still function as interpretative guidelines for the legislature and executive as well as 
basic principles of judicial review, but, at the same time uphold the distinction between 
politics and rights.106 Hence, implementing socio-economic ‘rights’ as directive 
principles in the constitution is appropriate to hold the government accountable for the 
fulfilment of the socio-economic needs of the population and thereby maximising the 
allocation of equal political power to the citizenry without amounting to a 
constitutional promise which cannot be kept.107 
The heart of the dispute was thus not whether socio-economic rights should be 
incorporated in the Constitution, but rather how they should be incorporated: As a 
justiciable part of the Bill of Rights or as mere directives of state policy.108 Put 
differently, the difficulty with socio-economic rights lies not within their general 
recognition but in their justiciability.109 It had been said for a long time that economic, 
social and cultural rights – unlike their civil and political counterparts – are not capable 
of being enforced by courts.110 With some variations, there are three major arguments 
against the justiciability of socio-economic rights. 
First of all, it is said that the content of socio-economic rights is too vague and 
indeterminate and therefore cannot be tested in court.111 This assumption is based on 
a comparison between the content of civil and political rights on the one hand, and 
socio-economic rights on the other. While the courts are capable to interpret the 
content of civil and political rights – for instance for the application of the right of 
freedom of expression by defining the term “expression” –, it should not be possible 
for the courts to give a similar sensible meaning to socio-economic rights, like health-
care or housing, which can be used as a legal standard in a courtroom. This is because 
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the fulfilment of these rights requires complex legislation and an elaborate 
administrative apparatus, and it obviously takes more than one political decision to 
create a functional health care system or an efficient governmental housing program. 
Judges should not be qualified to define how these political decisions should be taken 
and how the socio-economic right concerned should be realised.112 
This argument is closely related to the second claim against the possibility of 
judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights: the so called ‘positiveness 
argument’.113 Civil and political rights emerged as individual liberties directed against 
(previously unlawful, later unjustified) state intervention. Traditionally, they impose 
negative duties on the state not to interfere unjustifiably in the content of the right. 
Thus, they perform a defensive or negative function of protecting the individual 
against the state and merely require the state to leave one alone. The relatively 
straightforward way of enforcement of these rights is done via constitutional review 
which strikes down any unjustified state interference in the content of these rights.114 
Conversely, a social or economic right is a positive right which imposes a duty upon 
the state to provide certain resources and thereby requires the state to take positive 
action. However, the state can realize its duty in more than one way: The positive 
obligation created by socio-economic rights provides a meaningful scope of discretion 
to the legislature and the executive regarding the means to fulfil the right. Due to this 
fact, the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights is more complicated than that 
of civil and political rights. The first obstacle faced by a court is to fashion remedies 
which can deliver the content of the socio-economic right at all.115 And even if the 
court is capable of fashioning such remedies, how should the court – which itself lacks 
democratic legitimacy – review the policy taken by the elected political branches of 
government in regard of the particular socio-economic right without practically 
legislating? Such involvement in matters of the legislature raises concerns with regard 
to the separation of powers.116 
The third major objection against the enforceability of socio-economics rights is 
that their realisation is extreme costly. However, within the institutional framework of 
a democratic constitution, the allocation of the budget of a society is regularly vested 
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in the legislature which is democratically elected and the executive which holds a 
special expertise. Judges, on the other hand, lack the elements of, democratic 
legitimacy, special expertise and political oversight. Therefore, it should be 
inappropriate for judges to decide – trough the enforcement of socio-economic rights 
– how the budget of a society should be allocated.117 Due to the lack of democratic 
legitimacy and expertise, judges are ‘not qualified to evaluate how much is necessary 
to spend, nor how much society can afford, nor what its priorities are, or ought to 
be.’118 The political decision how socio-economic rights are to be realised and how 
the budgetary of the country is to be distributed should be placed in the governmental 
branches of the state. Here again, the objection is that judges are not qualified to take 
these political decisions. 
Recapitulating the three major arguments, they all have the same quintessence: 
The fulfilment of socio-economic rights requires multiple political decisions and there 
will always be more than one possible way how to realise them. The best way of 
fulfilment will be a matter of political and economic controversy.119 This makes the 
judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights relatively complex, at least more 
complex than the regular judicial enforcement of civil and political rights. Due to this 
complexity, so the assumption, judges are ill-suited to enforce socio-economic rights 
as they miss not only expertise but also democratic accountability to choose between 
the different possible means to realise the right concerned.120 
However, Etienne Mureinik, who advised the Democratic Party during the 
constitutional negotiations process, presented a forceful counterargument against 
these objections. He demonstrated that socio-economic rights are no different from 
civil and political rights when it comes to their enforcement through judicial review.121 
Hence, the argument against the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights is, in 
essence, the same argument against judicial or constitutional review in general.122 Put 
differently, the idea of a judicially enforceable bill of rights is inherently counter-
majoritarian irrespective if it only contains first generation rights or civil and political 
rights and socio-economic rights. In any event, it is not judicial review that appears to 
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be problematic but rather the intensity of this review. And, more importantly, in any 
case the reach and therefore the enforcement of a constitutional right is far from self-
evident.123 Reverting back to the exampled right of freedom of expression for instance, 
it is not sufficient for the court to define the term “expression” to perform judicial 
review. Instead, the court needs to examine whether there is an infringement of the 
right by a state action and furthermore, if the particular state action can be justified in 
general or at least in the specific context.124 For the question of justification, the right 
needs to be balanced with other constitutional values which should be achieved by the 
state action.125 Hence, the enforcement of first-generation rights is not as 
straightforward as it appears to be in the first place. This fact becomes particularly 
apparent when it comes to the enforcement of equality rights, where the legislature – 
at least in the situation that the infringement of the right is based on beneficial state 
measures – has more than one possibility to cure the infringement of the right of 
equality; either to include the excluded group in the future or to eliminate the grant or 
subsidy altogether. 
Nevertheless, when it concerns the traditional defensive or negative function of 
protecting the individual against interferences by the state, the enforcement of civil or 
political rights is still relatively straightforward. But apart from the fact that the 
development of fundamental rights went beyond this traditional negative function of 
protecting the individual against interferences by the state,126 not all of the so called 
first-generation rights constitute negative (passive) obligations from the outset. Some 
of them also impose positive duties upon the state, such as the right to a fair trial, the 
right to vote or the right to legal representation, which cannot be enforced by striking 
down unjustified state interference. Therefore, the distinction between civil and 
political rights as “negative” rights on the one hand and social and economic rights as 
“positive rights” on the other, cannot be upheld. 
Finally, the “expense” argument needs to be addressed. An argument to rebut the 
objection that judges lack the democratic legitimacy and institutional capacity to 
decide trough the enforcement of socio-economic rights how the budget of a society 
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should be allocated, can again be generated through a comparison between civil and 
political rights and socio-economic rights: For example, the right to a fair trial requires 
the state to ensure that there is a court structure, independent judges, a police force as 
well as a prison system which makes a large claim on the resources of the society if it 
is to be adequately recognised and properly implemented.127 Similarly, the right to 
vote requires the state to hold regular elections or to repeat the elections in case they 
are declared void, which can also lead to massive state expenditure. Even the 
enforcement of a typical political and civil right like the right to demonstrate for 
example can require the state to secure the demonstration route through the installation 
of roadblocks or to ensure that the participates of the right of assembly are protected 
against counter-demonstrations, which can give rise to state expense as well. Hence, 
the recognition and enforcement of fundamental rights is never for free and yet, despite 
the resource implications of their decisions, courts have never been criticised or been 
declared to be incapable of the enforcement of civil and political rights.128 The 
question is, why the courts should not be capable of enforcing socio-economic rights 
as well, regardless of the budgetary consequences? 
However, it has been argued that the important difference between the judicial 
enforcement of civil and political rights on the one hand and the affirmative aspect of 
social and economic rights on the other, lies within the size of the budgetary 
consequences.129 Although David Bilchitz, for instance, questions that the 
enforcement of socio-economic rights will always be significantly higher than the 
enforcement of civil and political rights by comparing the expense involved in 
maintaining an electoral system that realizes the right to vote with the expenditure on 
a feeding scheme,130 this argument cannot be totally dismissed. When it comes to the 
right of access to housing, which lies within the focus of interest of this study, it is 
beyond doubt that the expenses to provide every citizen access to housing are immense 
and it is most unlikely that the state will be able to provide necessary housing for the 
whole population on its own. Even in the City of Vienna during the 1920s, where the 
state put a lot of money and effort in state-owned social housing, only 10.8 per cent of 
the population ended up living in such accommodations before a change in 
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governmental leadership stopped the housing programmes in the early 1930s.131 
Therefore, to fulfil the right of access to housing the state needs to cooperate with 
private persons and companies. Nevertheless, the costs of such cooperation will be 
immense as well. In Germany, for instance, the Constitutional Court has developed an 
individually enforceable fundamental right of each person to enjoy the guarantee of a 
subsistence minimum which is in line with human dignity stemming from Article 1 
para 1 and Article 20 of the German Basic Law,132 including the right of access to 
housing,133 the state spent almost 20 billion € in the year 2016 to fulfil this obligation 
only in regard of housing. By comparison, the costs for the whole judicial system 
amounted to 13 billion € in the same year.134 Hence, the assumption that the fulfilment 
at least of the positive obligation of socio-economic rights will in general have more 
budgetary consequences than the fulfilment of civil and political rights is not 
completely misguided. 
Be this as it may, ‘the size of the budget consequences’135 still does not give rise 
to a difference of a decisive weight between civil and political rights and socio-
economic rights when it comes to their enforcement through judicial review.136 In any 
case, judges are not the ones determining the overall allocation of resources 
irrespective of which rights are getting reviewed.137 Exercising judicial review does 
not entail that judges will decide how to draw up the budget themselves without regard 
to the expertise of the executive and the framework of the legislature.138 The original 
decisions will be made by the democratically elected legislature and implied with the 
help of the expertise of the executive and these branches will be given a considerable 
leeway from the judiciary in case that it is necessary to uphold the separation of 
powers.139 The judges will merely review these decisions, not making them whereby 
both civil and political rights and socio-economic rights function as the standard 
against which the respective state action is measured and in this way the state is held 
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accountable.140 Hence, with the enforcement of socio-economic rights through judicial 
review judges are acting in a field where they are not missing expertise nor democratic 
accountability: ‘The application of human rights standards’.141 
Mureinik’s arguments together with the ANC commitment to deal with the social 
and economic legacy of Apartheid142 eventually led to the inclusion of a wide range 
of social and economic rights in the final Constitution, the most important of which 
are sections 26 (housing) and 27 (health care, food, water and social security) and the 
explicit recognition of the positive and negative dimensions of fundamental rights in 
section 7(2) of the Constitution that requires that the state to ‘respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil’ the rights in the Bill of Rights.143 The wording of section 26 and 27 of the 
Constitution closely follows the wording adopted in Article 11 para 1 and Article 2 
para 1 of the ICESCR. The reason for that is twofold: One the one hand, this was done 
to create some degree of consistency between South Africa's domestic policies and 
laws and its international human rights obligations.144 On the other hand, the UN 
Committee’s General Comments would provide a ready source of interpretation for 
the socio-economic right concerned.145 
However, despite great similarity of the provisions in the ICESCR and the 
Constitution, they are not identical, which was pointed out by the Constitutional Court 
in Grootboom and will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. At this point, I would 
like to draw the attention to another aspect in regard of the phrasing of the rights in 
the Constitution. Notwithstanding the clear declaration of the right of access to 
housing, health care, food, water and social security as directly enforceable 
constitutional rights, ‘an echo of the objection to their inclusion’,146 which has been 
outlined above, remains in the way the positive obligations of these rights have been 
formulated. The state is only obliged to ‘take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each 
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of these rights.’147 Hence, the phrasing of the rights took account of the availability of 
resources and the issue of appropriate forms of enforcement of these rights.148 In this 
regard, the ‘careful limitation of the scope and nature of the positive duties imposed 
by the qualified socio-economic rights […] seems to be aimed at mediating some of 
the difficulties with the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights that those 
opposed to their entrenchment have raised.’149 
Despite of the (academic) debates gone ahead, the amenability of socio-economic 
rights to adjudication and enforcement was confirmed early on by the Constitutional 
Court, although paired with a note of caution as well. In the first Certification 
judgment the Constitutional Court held: 
 
It is true that the inclusion of socio-economic rights may result in the court making 
orders that have implications for budgetary matters. However, even when a court 
enforces civil and political rights such as equality, freedom of speech or the right to a 
fair trial, the order it makes will often have such implications. A court may require the 
provision of legal aid, or the extension of state benefits to a class of people who were 
formerly not beneficiaries of such benefits. In our view, it cannot be said that by 
including socio-economic rights within a Bill of Rights, a task is conferred upon the 
courts so different from that ordinarily conferred upon them that it results in a breach 
of the separation of powers […] We are of the view that these rights are to some extent 
justiciable […] At the very minimum, socio-economic rights can be negatively 
protected from improper invasion.150 
 
Moreover, in this decision the Constitutional Court dismissed the objections that social 
and economic rights were not universally accepted, as required by Constitutional 
Principle II, and that their enforcement would inevitably lead to an infringement of the 
principle of the separation of powers.151 However, the Constitutional Court did remain 
silent about how (especially the affirmative dimension of) the socio-economic rights 
should be enforced. The remaining question thus was how the judiciary in South 
Africa should enforce those rights that are subject to ‘progressive realisation’ within 
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the states ‘available resources’. Hence, the debate moved from the question whether 
to include socio-economic rights in the constitution towards the question how socio-
economic rights can actually be adjudicated.152 This question should be addressed in 
the next chapter in regard of the right of access to housing in South Africa illustrated 
by the Grootboom case. 
 
IV. JUDCIAL ENFORCEMENT: THE GROOTBOOM CASE AND THE 
REASONABLENESS APPROACH 
As already mentioned in the introduction, the Grootboom case originated in the forced 
eviction of the community of Mrs Irene Grootboom by public authorities. Initially, the 
community – which consisted of 390 adults and 510 children – was based in an 
informal squatter settlement called Wallacedene which forms part of the Oostenberg 
municipality and lies on the eastern fringe of the Cape Metropolitan Area.153 The 
residents of the settlement were extremely poor, a quarter of the households in 
Wallacedene had no income at all, and more than two-thirds earned less than R500 per 
month during the year 1997.154 The conditions under which the residents of 
Wallacedene lived were described by the Constitutional Court as lamentable. ‘They 
had no water, sewage or refuse removal services and only 5% of the shacks had 
electricity.’155 Many of the residents had applied for subsidised low-cost housing from 
the municipality and had been on the waiting list for many years but without hope of 
being allocated such housing any time soon.156 
After heavy winter rainfall had left their part of the settlement waterlogged at the 
end of September 1998, the community of Mrs Grootboom decided to move out of 
Wallacedene onto an adjacent vacant property. The property was privately owned land 
which was earmarked for low cost housing.157 On 8 December 1998, the landowner 
secured an order for an eviction in the Magistrates’ court. The members of the 
community, however, remained on the land beyond the date by which they had been 
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ordered to vacate as their previous site in Wallacedene had by then already been filled 
by other persons and they had no other alternative place to go.158 
 In March 1999, the landowner returned to court to renew the eviction order. 
Unlike in the first proceedings, the magistrate appointed an attorney to represent the 
community. Negotiations between the parties resulted in the grant of an order requiring 
the community of Mrs Grootboom ‘to vacate the property and authorising the sheriff 
to evict them and to dismantle and remove any of their structures remaining on the 
land on 19 May 1999.’159 The magistrate’s order also included the negotiated 
agreement that the parties and the municipality would mediate to identify alternative 
land for the community, however, the municipality was not party of the proceedings 
which is why it remained unclear if the municipality was party to the settlement and 
the agreement to mediate.160 In the end, no mediation took place and on 18 May 1999 
the community was forcibly evicted on expense of the municipality. According to the 
Constitutional Court, the eviction had been carried out ‘prematurely and inhumanely: 
reminiscent of apartheid-style evictions. The respondents’ homes were bulldozed and 
burnt and their possessions destroyed. Many of the residents who were not there could 
not even salvage their personal belongings’.161 
Rendered homeless, the community members took shelter on the sports field 
adjacent to the community centre of Wallacedene in the barest of shelters.162 The 
attorney acting on behalf of the community wrote to the municipality and described 
the intolerable conditions under which his clients were living and demanded 
temporary accommodation for them from the municipality, however, without any 
satisfying outcome.163 Therefore, the community launched an urgent application in the 
High Court (Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division) and applied for an order 
requiring all three spheres of government to provide them with ‘temporary shelter 
and/or housing’ until they obtained permanent accommodation.164 One can say that 
the violation of the negative side of the right to access to housing thus had triggered 
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positive demands in regard of the right of access to housing, which therefore became 
subject of the case. 
 The High Court – based on the guidelines set out in the Soobramoney v The 
Minister of Health, Kwazulu Natal165 judgment, which was the first case where the 
Constitutional Court dealt with the enforcement of socio-economic rights – denied any 
obligation of the government in terms of section 26 of the Constitution and declared 
the government’s housing programme as rational.166 However, the High Court held 
that the children and through them their parents are entitled under section 28(1)(c) of 
the Constitution to be provided with shelter if the parents are not able to provide shelter 
to their own children whereby it considered “shelter” to be something less than 
“housing”.167 In this regard, the High Court considered ‘tents, portable latrines and a 
regular supply of water’ as the minimum to fulfil the constitutional obligations under 
section 28 of the Constitution.168 The government – namely the municipality of 
Oostenberg, the Cape Metropolitan Area, the Province of the Western Cape and the 
national Government – immediately appealed to the Constitutional Court, which first 
issued an order putting the municipality on terms to provide certain rudimentary 
services and then addressed the broader issues in an unanimous judgment with a 
different result in regard of the right of access to housing.169 
 
(a) Judgment of the Constitutional Court 
Before the Court turned to the interpretation of the scope and meaning of the right to 
access to housing and especially the state’s obligations engendered by section 26 of 
the Constitution, Yacoob J, writing for the Court, outlined the context in which socio-
economic rights and the rights in the Bill of Rights in general need to be interpreted. 
Like all the other rights in the Bill of Rights, section 26 of the Constitution is subject 
to a contextual interpretation.170 This contextual approach of interpretation requires 
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the consideration of two different types of context. First, all rights in the Bill of Rights 
must be understood in their textual setting which requires a consideration of Chapter 
2 (which contains the Bill of Rights) and the Constitution as a whole. Second, the 
rights must be understood in the social and historical context of the country.171 In this 
regard, the Court refers to the Soobramoney-case where Chaskalson P described the 
social and historical context in which the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted as follows: 
 
We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of people are 
living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of 
unemployment, inadequate social security, and many do not have access to clean water 
or to adequate health services. These conditions already existed when the Constitution 
was adopted and a commitment to address them, and to transform our society into one in 
which there will be human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new 
constitutional order. For as long as these conditions continue to exist that aspiration will 
have a hollow ring.172 
 
In regard of the systematic interpretation of the right of access to housing within 
the Bill of Rights and the whole Constitution, the Court stressed that all the rights in 
the Bill of Rights are inter-related and mutually supporting and that there is no doubt 
that the foundational values of the Constitution – human dignity, freedom and equality 
– are denied to those who have no food, clothing or shelter.173 The Court later relied 
on these values – especially human dignity – when it evaluated whether the community 
of Mrs. Grootboom is entitled to at least some (individual) relief in form of temporary 
housing.174 Furthermore, the Court held that the right of access to housing must be 
construed in the context of the other socio-economic rights contained in the 
Constitution.175 
In the following, the Court considered international law – namely the ICESCR – 
as an interpretation-tool of the Bill of Rights. The consideration of international law 
when interpreting the Bill of Rights is required by section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
Thereby, it did not matter that South Africa at the time of the judgment had not yet 
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ratified the Convention176 as the term “international law” includes non-binding as well 
as binding law.177 However, the fact that South Africa had not yet ratified the ICESCR 
meant that the country was not legally bound by the Convention rights, which limited 
its relevance for the interpretation of the constitutional rights.178 The Court stated that 
in cases where the international law is not directly applicable in South Africa, it still 
functions as ‘a guide to interpretation but the weight to be attached to any particular 
principle or rule of international law will vary.’179 
 The significance of the Covenant and the developed minimum core approach of 
the Committee for the interpretation of the positive obligation under section 26 of the 
Constitution was first and foremost emphasised by the Community Law Centre of the 
University of the Western Cape and the Human Rights Commission, who functioned 
as amici curie in the case.180 The Court, however, stressed the differences between the 
relevant provisions of the Covenant and the South African Constitution in regard of 
the right to housing, which – in the eyes of the Court – limited the influence of the 
Covenant as an interpretation-tool.181 While the Covenant provides in Article 11 
para 1 for a right to adequate housing, section 26 of the Constitution provides for the 
right of access to adequate housing. While the Covenant obliges the states parties to 
take appropriate steps which must include particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures, section 26(2) of the Constitution obliges the State to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures.182 Nevertheless, the Court did not dismiss the concept 
of minimum core obligations outright and even considered that there ‘may be cases 
where it may be possible and appropriate to have regard to the content of minimum 
core obligation to determine whether the measures taken by the state are 
reasonable.’183 Hence, under particular circumstances, the minimum core concept 
might be relevant to reasonableness.184 However, the Court noted critically that the 
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General Comment No. 3 of the Committee does not define what the minimum core 
actually means185 and that the definition of a minimum core in the context of ‘the right 
to have access to adequate housing’ presents difficult questions, given the fact that 
different groups are differently situated and thus the fulfilment of the right may vary 
according to the different needs.186 Unlike the Committee, the Court lacks the requisite 
information that would enable it to determine the content of minimum core obligations 
in the context of the South African Constitution and it regards itself unable to collect 
these information.187 As can already be inferred from the above cited statement, the 
Constitutional Court rather considered the question whether the measures taken by the 
state to realise the right afforded by the state are reasonable as the “real question” in 
terms of the South African Constitution and thus did not further engage with a possible 
content of a minimum core in the context of section 26 of the Constitution.188 
Turning to the nature and scope of the state’s obligations engendered by section 
26 of the Constitution, the Court first declared that subsections (1) and (2) are related 
and thus must be read together.189 According to the Court, subsection (1) aims to 
delineate the scope of the right whereby the positive obligations of this right are further 
spelled out in subsection (2).190 However, the content of the scope of the right to access 
to housing delineated in subsection (1) of section 26 of the Constitution – as outlined 
by the Court – remained very vague. Although the Court repeats the fact that the 
section 26(1) of the Constitution contains a right to access to housing in contrast to the 
right to adequate housing as it is encapsulated in the Covenant, the ‘significant 
difference’ between those two rights remains – at least in my opinion – unclear.191 
According to the Court, it means that the right of access to housing 
 
entails more than brick and mortar. It requires available land, appropriate services such 
as the provision of water and the removal of sewage and the financing of all of these, 
including the building of the house itself. For a person to have access to adequate housing 
all of these conditions need to be met: there must be land, there must be services, there 
must be dwelling.192 
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The Court thus seems to take the view that the right to access to adequate housing in 
the Constitution offers or protects more than the right to adequate housing in the 
Convention. One suggestion is that the ‘right to adequate housing’ primarily 
concentrates on the provision of affordable housing by the state, while the ‘right of 
access to housing” also emphasises the necessity to regulate the relationship between 
private owners and tenants.193 One can even interpret the Court’s view in a broader 
sense, namely in the sense that the state has an obligation to ensure that it is possible 
for people to get access to housing, which requires from the state much more than just 
to build houses. It requires from the state to put in in place a legal framework which 
enables people to build houses. 
Apart from that, Yacoob J only emphasised that the fulfilment of this right may 
require different measures in regard of different living situations of people and 
therefore highly depends on the context. The state’s obligation to provide access to 
adequate housing ‘may differ from province to province, from city to city, form rural 
to urban areas and from person to person.’194 Nevertheless, with the above cited 
passage, the Court as least assigned some – very relative and context-specific – content 
to the right of access to adequate housing under section 26(1) of the Constitution. 
 However, as mentioned above, ‘[s]ubsections (1) and (2) are related and must be 
read together.’195 This means that the content – in regard of the positive state’s 
obligations – is subject to the limitations of subsection (2) of the Constitution. 
According to the Court, ‘subsection (2) makes it clear that the obligation imposed upon 
the state is not an absolute or unqualified one.’196 The extent of the positive state’s 
obligation is rather defined by three key elements: ‘The state is obliged: (a) to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures; (b) within its available resources; (c) to 
achieve the progressive realisation of the right.’197 
In this respect, the Court followed the path of the Soobramoney-judgment198 and 
departs from the classical two-stage approach, which it regularly applies in regard to 
the limitation of the rights in the Bill of Rights.199 Under the two-stage approach, the 
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‘first question to be asked is whether the provision in question infringes the rights 
protected by the substantive clauses of the Bill of Rights. If it does, the next question 
that arises will be whether that infringement is justified.’200 Hence, the two-stage 
approach requires a court first to examine the content of a right in order to determine 
whether the right was limited. Only afterwards the court needs to explore whether the 
limitation of the right can be justified, regularly under the general limitation clause of 
section 36 of the Constitution.201 However, when it comes to the enforcement of the 
positive obligations of socio-economic rights which are subject to ‘progressive 
realisation’ within the states ‘available resources’, the Court conflates the two stages 
into one and treats the internal limitations set out in section 26(2) of the Constitution 
as part of the determination of the scope of protection of the right.202 As a result, the 
scope of the positive obligations imposed upon the state under section 26(1) is a priori 
confined through the three elements of section 26(2) of the Constitution. The core 
enquiry the Court undertakes is thus examining whether the measures taken by the 
state to realise the right to access to housing were reasonable to achieve the progressive 
realisation of the right within its available resources.203 
 In doing so, Yacoob J stated that ‘reasonable legislative and other measures’ must 
be determined in light of the fact that the Constitution creates different spheres of 
government. Therefore, a reasonable programme to achieve access to housing must 
clearly allocate responsibility to the different tiers of government and create a co-
ordinated and comprehensive policy which is adequate to meet the state’s section 26 
obligations.204 As the state is required to take ‘reasonable and other measures’, mere 
legislation is not sufficient.205 National and provincial government must rather ensure 
that the executive obligations imposed by legislation are met. Hence, policies and 
programmes must be reasonable in both their conception and their execution.206 
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Overall, the state’s ‘programme must be capable of facilitating the realisation of the 
right.’207 
 To determine whether the measures taken by the state are reasonable, it will also 
‘be necessary to consider housing problems in their social, economic and historical 
context and to consider the capacity of institutions responsible for implementing the 
programme.’208 It must balance short, medium and long-term needs and must be 
flexible in this regard.209 Most importantly, ‘[a] programme that excludes a significant 
segment of society cannot be said to be reasonable.’210 At this point of the judgment, 
the Court considers the context of the Bill of Rights as a whole and the interpretation 
clause of section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution for the interpretation of reasonableness. 
The result of this consideration is not equated with the minimum core obligation; 
however, it requires from the state to provide at least some form of relief for those 
desperately in need of access to housing: 
 
A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all if it is 
to be a society based on human dignity, freedom and equality. To be reasonable, measures 
cannot leave out of account the degree and extent of the denial of the right they endeavour 
to realise. Those whose needs are the most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights 
therefore it most in peril, must not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving 
realisation of the right. It may not be sufficient to meet the test of reasonableness to show 
that the measures are capable of achieving a statistical advance in the realisation of the 
right. […] If the measures, though statistically successful, fail to respond to the needs of 
those most desperate, they may not pass the test.211 
 
All in all, the Court offered several elements, which need to be taken into account, 
when measuring the reasonability of the state’s action taken to fulfil the right of access 
to housing. Although the Court did not provide a comprehensive definition of 
reasonableness and states that ‘[r]reasonableness must be determined on the facts of 
each case’212, it outlined the notion of reasonableness through these elements. 
Nevertheless, the vagueness of these elements creates a wide range rather than a 
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precise point for the legislature and the executive when it comes to the progressive 
realisation of the right within the state’s available resources. Moreover, Yacoob J 
emphasised the discretion of the democratic legislature and the executive in regard of 
the decision which measures should be adopted for realisation of the right. The concept 
of reasonableness allows the legislature and executive to decide on the measures that 
need to be taken in realising the right to access to housing, as long as it falls within the 
wide latitude of reasonableness as outlined by the Court: 
 
A Court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether other more desirable or 
favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether public money could have been 
better spent. The question would be whether the measures that have been adopted are 
reasonable. It is necessary to recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be 
adopted by the State to meet its obligations. Many of these would meet the requirement 
of reasonableness. Once it is shown that the measures do so, this requirement is met.213 
 
In regard of the phrase ‘progressive realisation’, which was taken identical in 
wording from Article 2 para 1 of the ICESCR, the Court highlighted ‘that it was 
contemplated that the right could not be realised immediately’.214 However, the state 
must take steps to achieve the goal that the basic needs of all members of the society 
are effectively met.215 In contrast to the minimum core concept of the United Nations 
Committee, which adoption was essentially rejected by the Court, for the definition of 
the term ‘progressive realisation’, the Court relied directly on para 9 of the General 
Comment No. 3, which imposes an obligation on the state parties to move as 
expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realisation of the Convention 
Rights and introduces the concept of non-retrogression.216 This meaning was 
explicitly endorsed by Yacoob J as the meaning is ‘in harmony with the context in 
which the phrase is used in our Constitution.’217 
Finally, the Court considered the last element of section 26(2) of the Constitution 
– ‘within the available resources’ – and found that the state is not required to do more 
to achieve the realisation of the right than its available resources permit.218 Like 
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Chaskalson P observed in the Soobramoney judgement, ‘[w]hat is apparent form these 
provisions is that the obligations imposed on the State […] are dependent upon the 
resources available for such purposes, that the corresponding rights themselves are 
limited by reason of the lack of resources.’219 Hence, the availability of resources 
limits the scope of the right of access to housing from the outset. Beyond that and 
interestingly enough, the availability of resources is also an important factor in 
determining what is reasonable. Both the content of the right as well as the 
reasonableness of measures employed to achieve the realisation of the right are 
governed by the availability of resources.220 
Within this framework, the Court went on and evaluated whether the housing 
programme that had been adopted by the state was reasonable.221 It found that the state 
had created a coherently and comprehensive housing programme whose ‘medium and 
long term objectives cannot be criticised’.222 However, the state’s housing programme 
– at the national level – did not content any component providing for those in desperate 
need like Mrs Grootboom and her community in the short term.223 ‘The absence of 
such a component may have been acceptable if the nationwide housing programme 
would result in affordable houses for most needy people within a reasonably short 
time.’224 Since it was foreseeable that this was not going to happen, the Court found 
that the absence of such a component was unreasonable: 
 
The nationwide housing programme falls short of obligations imposed upon national 
government to the extent that it fails to recognise that the state must provide for relief for 
those in desperate need. They are not be ignored in the interests of an overall programme 
focussed on medium and long-term objectives. It is essential that a reasonable part of the 
national housing budget be devoted to this, but the precise allocation is for national 
government to decide in the first instance.225 
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Hence, the state’s housing programme was declared to be unconstitutional.226 
However, this did not mean that Mrs Grootboom and the other members of her 
community were automatically entitled to individual relief. Section 26 of the 
Constitution obliges the state to provide access to housing, but – as outlined above – 
it does only oblige the state to take reasonable measures within available resources to 
progressively achieve the realisation of the right. Consequently, the individual has a 
right, but only a right to demand that the state takes reasonable action to address the 
housing needs of those individuals who cannot provide for themselves or who need 
assistance from the state before they would be able to gain access to adequate 
housing.227 Section 26 of the Constitution, however, does not entitle any person to 
claim shelter or housing immediately upon demand.228  
Nevertheless, the Court considered whether the respondents are entitled to at least 
some relief in form of temporary housing because of their special situations and the 
governments conduct towards them.229 At this point, Yacoob J stressed again the 
importance of the inherent dignity of human beings for the evaluation of the 
reasonableness of state action. ‘The Constitution will be worth infinitely less than its 
paper if the reasonableness of state action concerned with housing is determined 
without regard to the fundamental constitutional value of human dignity.’230 However, 
at the hearing of the Court in May 2000 the government had offered some temporary 
accommodation that was accepted by Mrs. Grootboom and her community, which is 
why eventually the Court did not need to decide about the question whether the 
community should be entitled to some relief in form of temporary housing.231 In the 
end, the Court issued a declaratory order, which required from the state to devise and 
implement within its available resources a comprehensive and coordinated housing 
programme, including measures which provide relief for people in desperate need to 
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progressively achieve the right of access to adequate housing.232 The Court indicated 
that these measures should be similar, ‘but not necessarily limited to those 
contemplated in the Accelerated Managed Land Settlement Programme’233, which 
was drafted by the local authority, but was not in force when the case commenced.234 
The monitoring of the fulfilment of the obligations of the judgement and the section 
26 obligations in general, however, were left to the Human Rights Commission, which 
– according to section 184(1)(c) of the Constitution – ‘monitor[s] and assess[es] the 
observance of human rights in the Republic’.235 
 
(b) Early praise and emerging criticism – reasonableness between separation of 
powers and the transformative character of the South African Constitution 
The body of literature on the Grootboom-case and the reasonableness approach of the 
South African Constitutional Court appears practically infinite. I will thus focus on 
the main streams that came up after the judgement. On the one hand, early responses 
to the judgment inside and outside of South Africa were positive and Grootboom was 
hailed as a victory for the enforcement of the affirmative dimension of socio-economic 
rights. After the highly controversial discussion concerning the inclusion and 
justiciability of socio-economic rights before and during the constitutional making 
process and the somehow disappointing outcome of the Soobramoney-case, the 
Constitutional Court’s judgement reassured the proponents of socio-economic rights 
that it was willing to adjudicate the positive dimension flowing from these rights. 
Moreover, the Court was celebrated for setting out an approach that provides a 
meaningful historically, and textually-conscious content to the right to access to 
housing without, at the same time, unduly interfering in the sphere of the legislature 
and executive and thus upholding the separation of powers doctrine.236 On the other 
hand, and certainly against the backdrop of South Africa’s continuing situation of 
housing rights deprivation, but also because of the “stronger” forms of enforcement of 
socio-economic rights by other constitutional courts later on237, the judgement and 
especially the rejection of the minimum core principle attracted criticism. The 
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reasonableness approach was considered to deprive the socio-economic rights of any 
content and thereby being unable to live up to the transformative promises of the South 
African Constitution.238 
Looking at the different arguments, one can definitely state that they mirror and 
continue the discussion which accompanied the inclusion of socio-economic rights in 
the first place and demonstrate that the duty to facilitate or promote rights, which need 
only to be realised progressively with reasonable measures and in accordance with 
available resources, gives rise to the greatest difficulties when it comes to determining 
breaches and the appropriate standard of judicial scrutiny that should be applied.239 
Regarding the positive responses to the judgment first, it was a scholar from outside 
South Africa and a former opponent of the inclusion of socio-economic rights into 
constitutions, Cass Sunstein, who considered the Court’s ruling as a ‘distinctive and 
novel approach to socio-economic rights, requiring not shelter for everyone, but 
sensible priority-setting, with particular attention to the plight of those who are 
neediest.’240 In his opinion, the approach was respectful of democratic prerogatives 
and the simple fact of limited budgets and thus offered a middle course between the 
entitlement of an individually enforceable right and complete non-justiciability of 
socio-economic rights.241 This “weak” form of judicial review242 in regard of the 
enforcement of socio-economic rights was also praised by Jeanne Woods who saw the 
decision as an evidence of the possibility of judicial restraint, which at the same time 
sets out stringent criteria by which the courts can measure states’ compliance to socio-
economic rights.243 According to Woods, the Court highlighted the priority status of 
the right to housing and the plight of those deprived of that right, but left the legislature 
the ultimate policy decision of how much of the state’s resources should be committed 
to the right to housing and thus found an appropriate way of judicial enforcement of 
socio-economic rights.244 
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Another (positive) understanding of the judgment was offered by Pierre de Vos 
by inferring from it that socio-economic rights and the right to equality are particularly 
close together.245 He argues that the reasonableness approach of the Constitutional 
Court manifests a particular understanding of the role of the Bill of Rights as a 
transformative document aimed at addressing the deeply entrenched social and 
economic inequality in the South African society.246 In this understanding, the right to 
equality and the social and economic rights are two sides of the same coin, which both 
try to achieve the creation of a society where all people can achieve their full potential 
as human beings.247 Therefore, when interpreting the social and economic rights of 
the Constitution, the Court – like in Grootboom – has to pay attention to the different 
social and economic circumstances in which different groups find themselves.248 The 
fact that the government’s housing programme did not provide relief for those in 
desperate need of access to housing made it unreasonable, and hence an infringement 
of section 26 of the Constitution. The same result – so argued by De Vos – could have 
been reached under section 9(3) of the Constitution as the unreasonable exclusion of 
one whole sector of the society strongly indicated that this exclusion also constituted 
unfair discrimination.249 Even if one does not concur with the interpretation that the 
Grootboom judgement is centred around substantive equality,250 the identified 
proximity between the right to equality and the socio-economic rights is certainly 
undeniable. At least as long as (financial) resources are limited – which is the case in 
every state – the supply with housing, health care, education etc. is always related to 
questions of equitable distribution and thus to substantive equality. With the 
adjudication of these rights, under the notion of unfair discrimination or under 
reasonableness – one can say – the Court facilitates the transformative character of the 
Constitution. 
 However, in the ensuing years, the reasonableness approach has encountered 
criticism which was probably triggered by the continuing housing deficiencies in 
South Africa and the fact that the obligations set out in Grootboom had been poorly 
implemented by the government. Two years after the judgment, Kameshni Pillay 
                                                          
245 Pierre de Vos op cit note 19, 258. 
246 Ibid at 259. 
247 Ibid at 265. 
248 Ibid at 267. 
249 Ibid at 270. 
250 Ibid at 270. 
39 
 
stated that ‘there has been little tangible or visible change in housing policy so as to 
cater for people who find themselves in desperate need crises situations.’251 Most 
significantly for the public, the judgement failed to change the living conditions of the 
litigants. In July 2002, the community of Mrs. Grootboom still found itself on the 
sports field in makeshift shelters.252 Even in the following years the government failed 
to fully comply with its constitutional obligations flowing from the judgement.253 
Eventually in 2008, Mrs. Grootboom died being only in her 40s while still waiting for 
formal housing.254 It seemed like the reasonableness approach ‘gives the state such 
wide latitude that maybe everyone will get the bare minimum in 20 or 30 years. In the 
meantime, people will live and die with their constitutional rights in their hands.’255 
Although research shows that the Grootboom judgement actually had not remained 
without effect on the housing policy of the government and that the reasonable 
assessment forms part of policy calculations,256 the impression was created that the 
reasonableness approach was widely unable to protect the poor. 
Considering the critique in some more detail, its central argument is that the 
reasonableness approach failed to develop a substantive interpretation of the right of 
access to housing due to the lack of engagement with section 26(1) of the Constitution 
and is thus unable to protect those who are deprived of even a minimum essential level 
of housing.257 The alleged failure to develop the normative content of the right to 
access to housing has been criticised based on different arguments. First, it was 
contested that section 26(1) of the Constitution, which, on its face, is only qualified 
through the word ‘adequate’ should merely entitle the individual to positive state 
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actions which are limited through subsection (2). According to the amici curiae in the 
Treatment Action Campaign case, section 26(1) of the Constitution should rather 
entitle to a self-standing right, which imposes independent obligations in form of a 
minimum core obligation on the state.258 The Court, however, held that the textual 
formulation of section 26 (and section 27) of the Constitution did not support this 
interpretation of a self-standing right.259 As emphasised in the Grootboom judgement, 
section 26(1) and section 26(2) of the Constitution ‘are related and must be read 
together’.260 Hence, there is no self-standing right provided by section 26(1) of the 
Constitution imposing positive obligations on the state beside the positive obligations 
limited through section 26(2) of the Constitution. 
Although the Constitutional Court by reasoning in this way offers one plausible 
textual reading of section 26 of the Constitution, one can certainly criticize the 
consequences the Court draws from this systematic interpretation. As mentioned 
above, the Court not only reads the two subsections together, it also conflates the two 
stages of the approach – which it regularly applies in order to examine whether a 
limitation of a right of the Bill of right is justified, the threshold stage and the 
justification stage – into one. Instead of (neatly) outlining the content of the right of 
access to housing before examining the justification of its limitation, the Court rather 
took section 26(2) of the Constitution and the reasonableness approach as a starting 
point for its enquiry, the provision which concerns itself with the limitations on 
government’s obligations. In doing so – so the allegation goes – the deference owed 
to the government in defining reasonable measures is unduly expended to the state in 
defining the content of the right itself – a manoeuvre which is unsupported by the 
wording of section 26 of the Constitution.261 As David Bilchitz points out, the word 
‘reasonable’ refers to the word ‘measures’ in section 26(2) of the Constitution and not 
to the right itself.262 Hence, the Court is obliged first to define the content of the right 
and only afterwards proceed to an evaluation of the reasonableness and the 
government’s progressive realisation of the right.263 ‘The measures the government 
adopts must be reasonable in relation to the objective it seeks to achieve, which is to 
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realise the right of access to adequate housing. This enquiry requires the specification 
of some content to the right, independently of the notion of reasonableness’.264 The 
Court by applying the reasonableness approach treats the internal limitations set out 
in section 26(2) of the Constitution in regard of the measures as part of the 
determination of the content of the right and thus mingles means and objection. 
However, the differentiation between means and content of the right is not an easy 
task when it comes to the enforcement of affirmative duties of the state. As far as the 
negative dimension of a fundamental right is concerned, the enquiry of reasonableness 
including proportionality regularly functions as a limitation of state power in order to 
protect the individual rights bearer. Put differently, the state is not allowed to use 
means which unduly infringe the right, which is measured inter alia by the standard 
of reasonableness.265 Conversely, in section 26(1) and (2) of the Constitution where 
the positive dimension of the right of access to housing is concerned, reasonableness 
functions as a description and yet limitation of the state’s obligations in order to fulfil 
the right. The state must (only) use reasonable measures to fulfil the right, no more 
and no less. Although it is related to the term ‘measures’, reasonableness thus 
indirectly functions as a limitation of the right as well as the term ‘within its available 
resources’ and the ‘progressive realisation’. 
As long as one will not follow the suggestion of the amici curiae in the TAC case 
and assume that section 26(1) gives a free-standing right unattached from section 26 
(2) of the Constitution, there is, however, still one other interpretative way to prevent 
that reasonableness and the other limitations is “eating away” the content of the right 
to access to housing: Section 26(1) of the Constitution must entitle the individual at 
least to a minimum core consistent with the maintenance of human dignity, which 
cannot be limited through subsection (2). Following this interpretation, section 26(1) 
and 26(2) of the Constitution may still be read together, however, the limitations set 
out in subsection (2) must be construed under consideration of the minimum core 
obligations. Although the concept has had its share of critics as well,266 which inter 
alia objected that the minimum core concept creates the danger that courts will 
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transgress the boundaries of their institutional legitimacy and competence and thus 
would undermine the separation of powers doctrine,267 the minimum core approach is 
– in the eyes of its proponents – better suited than the reasonableness approach to 
provide content to the right to access to housing and thereby to protect those who are 
deprived of even a minimum essential level of housing. According to its proponents, 
most prominently David Bilchitz, the minimum core shifts the emphasis to the 
development of the normative content of the right to access to housing and away from 
the disproportionate focus on the limitation of the right.268 
Under the minimum core concept, the state should be obliged to ensure that 
individuals are not exposed to the general conditions that threaten their survival 
(‘minimum interest’).269 In regard of the right of access to adequate housing this 
would, according to Bilchitz, ‘amount to having at least minimal shelter from the 
elements such that one’s health and thus one’s ability to survive are not 
compromised.’270 This would require ‘that individuals can at all times have access to 
accommodation that offers protection from the elements, sanitary conditions, and 
access to basic services such as sanitation and running water.’271 In addition to that 
minimum core, section 26(1) of the Constitution should also entitle individuals to a 
form of accommodation that puts them in a position to flourish and achieve their goals 
(maximum interest).272 This could, for instance, be achieved by a standard of housing 
which meets the requirements of adequate housing identified by the United Nations 
Committee in General Comment No. 4.273 However, while the fulfilment of this 
maximum interests ensured by section 26(1) of the Constitution must only be realised 
progressively, the fulfilment of the minimum core must be addressed as a matter of 
urgency.274 Only the full realisation of the right should thus be subject to the 
reservation of progressive realisation in section 26(2) of the Constitution.275 The same 
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should obviously apply for the term ‘reasonable measures’.276. In regard of the term 
‘available resources’, the non-fulfilment of the minimum core obligation should also 
be limited by resource constraints, yet putting a heavy burden of justification on the 
state to clearly show it had prioritised all its available resources to ensure the fulfilment 
of its core obligations.277 Hence, the level of scrutiny under the minimum core 
principle is significantly stricter.278 When defining the state’s available resources, it is 
even considered to include privately held resources that lie within the control of the 
state.279 The implications for adjudication are that a court must require particularly 
weighty reasons by way of justification from the state for a failure to fulfil the 
minimum core obligations.280 
In this way, the minimum core concept should assign a meaningful content to the 
right of access to housing unlike reasonableness. Rather than only knowing that ‘there 
must be land, there must be services, there must be dwelling’281 in order to fulfil the 
right, the minimum core concept should offer a more specific standard from which the 
extent of the citizens’ socio-economic entitlements and the state’s obligations can be 
measured and adjudicated.282 Moreover, opposed to the reasonableness approach, 
which has been deemed as an “administrative law model”283 – although there are some 
significant differences between the ways reasonableness is applied in administrative 
law and in the context of socio-economic rights284 – the minimum core concept puts a 
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focus on the interests of those whose life circumstances fall below the minimum core 
level.285 While the reasonableness approach only considers the reasonableness of the 
steps taken, which leads to a ‘proceduralisation of the socio-economic rights’286, the 
minimum core concept prioritises the interests of the poor and vulnerable sector of 
society and thus offers a substantive approach. Phrased vice versa, the reasonableness 
approaches’ only concern seems to be ‘whether government acts in a manner 
consistent with procedural good governance standards in its attempts to realise socio-
economic rights’287 (“input-perspective”) and not whether the outcome of 
government’s policies will actually provide basic shelter for people (“output-
perspective”). Eventually, that leaves the constitutional right of access to housing 
more or less empty. Under the minimum core concept, conversely, the individual 
should be entitled to have its basic needs fulfilled instantly with a corresponding 
obligation imposed on the state. Consequently, the minimum core concept should be 
better suited to judicially facilitate the right of access to housing and, in addition to 
that, be in line with international law – namely the ICESCR288 –, the transformative 
character of the South African Constitution, and especially human dignity. 
 However, the reasonableness approach – at least in the way the Court applied it in 
Grootboom – can hardly be considered to violate international law or the Constitution 
either.289 First, the allegation that the Court did not provide any content to the right of 
access to housing is simply not correct. The Court assigned at least some content to 
the right under section 26(1) of the Constitution, even though this content did not adopt 
the minimum core concept nor the sophisticated definition of ‘adequate housing’ given 
by the UN Committee.290 Nevertheless, the Court made it quite clear that the right to 
access to housing involves more than shelter: ‘It requires available land, appropriate 
services such as the provision of water and the removal of sewage and the financing 
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of all of these, including the building of the house itself.’291 The development of this 
content, however, took place without consideration of the underlying values of the 
Constitution, namely human dignity, equality and freedom and thus indeed still leaves 
room for further engagement.292 Moreover, the content only needs to be achieved 
progressively within the available resources through reasonable legislative or other 
measures. The question therefore is, if reasonableness diminishes the content which 
the Court assigned to section 26(1) of the Constitution, leaving it blank in the end. 
However, this allegation is – at least regarding reasonableness as applied in 
Grootboom, which can certainly be considered to be ‘arguable the farthest reaching of 
the Court’s socio-economic rights decisions’293 – equally unfounded. While it is true 
that the Court found that section 26 of the Constitution only gives a right to demand 
that the state takes reasonable action to address peoples’ housing needs in general, it 
still emphasised the need for the state to elevate the plight of those in desperate 
circumstances while evaluating reasonableness.294 In doing so, the Court did not 
expressly introduce a minimum core into reasonableness, however, the result almost 
creates the same ‘net effect’ despite of the remaining dogmatic differences between 
the two approaches.295 The state is required to provide at least some form of relief for 
those desperately in need of access to housing.296 In certain situations and under the 
consideration of human dignity this might even lead to the grant of a fairly instant 
claim for shelter.297 Hence, it seems as if the basic normative idea behind the 
formulation of a minimum core content that certain basic needs should enjoy 
preference over more advanced elements of the right to housing and should thus be 
addressed as a matter of urgency, can easily be incorporated in the reasonableness 
approach.298 Thus it can be argued that reasonableness also protects those who are 
deprived of even a minimum essential level of housing and in this way ensures the 
(normatively) necessary respect for human dignity. Such ‘[a] jurisprudence which is 
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based on a principle that the poorest must be given priority is not a development that 
should be discarded as being unhelpful to the vision of the Constitution.’299 Therefore, 
the reasonableness approach is legally defensible and cannot be rejected in the first 
place from a constitutional point of view. Moreover, the reasonableness approach, at 
least in the way it was outlined in Grootboom, is not ‘entirely toothless’300 and thus 
not per se making the right of access to housing effectively meaningless. Due to its 
flexibility, it rather enables the Court to enforce even significant changes to social and 
economic policy.301 To answer the research question, it is therefore necessary to have 
a closer look at some aspects of the judicial review of the right of access to housing 
other than the approach to the content of the right and to examine whether these aspects 
hinder the facilitation of the right. 
 
(c) Beyond Grootboom and beyond South Africa – is reasonableness hindering the 
judicial enforceability of the right of access to housing or are we barking up the wrong 
tree? 
In order to evaluate whether the reasonableness approach makes the right to access to 
housing “real” or effectively meaningless, in the last part of this chapter, I will have a 
closer look on the judicial review of the right of access to housing. Though I am well 
aware that judicial review is by no means the only way that fundamental rights are 
upheld and, maybe it is not even the most effective one, it is the way that matters in 
the context of the alleged shortcomings of reasonableness and thereby in the context 
of this study. What is more, the great value that the Constitution itself attributes 
judicial enforcement can be inferred from the fact that the South African Constitution 
– like numerous other constitutions and declarations throughout the world – provides 
in section 34 the right to access to the courts. 
 Judicial review regularly serves the facilitation of fundamental rights in two ways: 
On the one hand, by granting individual relief to the litigant, judicial review has the 
effect that the rights of an individual in a particular case are upheld (subjective 
function). One the other, and perhaps more importantly, the judicial review of 
fundamental rights in a specific case always has a spill-over effect in such a way that 
the protection of fundamental rights of the individual simultaneously fosters the 
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validity of the rights in a broader sense (objective function). By deciding the particular 
case, the courts vindicate the Constitution in general and, by setting out the 
constitutional standards, they provide guidance to the legislative and executive and 
thus deter future infringements of the Constitution. 
Prerequisites for the fulfilment of both functions are, however, twofold: First, 
litigants must have access to the Court in the first place or, speaking metaphorically, 
the door for judicial review by the Constitutional Court has to stand (procedurally) 
open. Secondly, the Court’s rulings need to be effectively implemented. Since courts 
have no power to execute or implement their own decisions themselves, the effective 
implementation highly depends on the readiness of the two other branches to follow 
the Court’s rulings. However, the Court can at least influence the implementation of 
its decisions with the remedy it fashions in a particular case. The awarded remedy can 
be pivotal for the implementation of a Court’s ruling. 
In this regard, the Grootboom case has been criticised as well. Although the 
Constitutional Court considered whether Mrs. Grootboom and her community by 
virtue of their human dignity should be entitled to at least some form of relief,302 it 
eventually did ultimately not decide this question due to the achieved agreement 
between the parties.303 Hence, the Court abstained from ordering any individualised 
remedy.304 Moreover, the Court – unlike the High Court in the previous procedure in 
regard of section 28 of the Constitution305 – also abstained from issuing any form of a 
so called structural or supervisory remedy.306 If the Court had issued such a remedy, 
it would have meant the Court would be getting involved in monitoring government’s 
compliance with the constitutional requirements outlined in its judgement.307 Such a 
structural remedy, however, would have additionally required the Court to outline in 
more detail in its judgement (for example by giving a timeframe) how exactly the 
government should come to terms with its constitutional obligations flowing from the 
right of access to housing. Instead, the Court opted for a relatively “weak” form of 
enforcement by awarding a simple declaratory order, leaving the remedy of the 
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constitutional defect in its housing programme entirely to the state.308 The Court 
merely stated that the political branches had the obligation to devise and implement a 
coherent, coordinated programme including measures which provide relief for people 
in desperate need to progressively achieve the right of access to adequate housing.309 
Furthermore, the supervision of the fulfilment of these obligations was left to the 
Human Rights Commission, which had promised to ‘monitor and, if necessary, report 
in terms of these powers on the effort made by the state to comply with its section 26 
obligations in accordance with this judgement’.310 
Whether this statement by the Constitutional Court constituted an actual order or 
not is disputed.311 Nevertheless, the Human Rights Commission reported on the 
implementation. On 14 November 2001, the Commission made a report to the Court 
concerning the dispute between branches of government over responsibility of 
implementation and the lack of the clarity over the content of the declaratory order.312 
The Court, however, refused to further engage with it, declining that it possessed an 
ongoing oversight role.313 The supervision of the Human Rights Commission 
eventually did not lead to a satisfactory outcome, at least for the community of Mrs. 
Grootboom, as shown above.314 Consequently, scholars argued that this weak form of 
enforcement of the positive dimension of the right of access to housing in Grootboom 
was a failure.315 Therefore, the idea emerged that in order to be effective, the remedy 
in socio-economic rights cases needed to be constituted a little less “weak”.316 
Assessing the socio-economic rights adjudication outside of South Africa and the 
academically discussed proposals, essentially it is assumed that the two above-
mentioned remedies would provide a “stronger” form of socio-economic rights 
enforcement: First of all, an individualised form of enforcement where the court grants 
individual relief to the plaintiffs, whose rights are not fulfilled. This form of 
enforcement is for instance practised by the Colombian Constitutional Court – 
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procedurally applied through an individual complaints mechanism.317 Secondly, the 
application of a structural or supervisory remedy, where the court itself closely 
monitors and supervises the fulfilment of the rights by the legislative and executive. 
In principle, both of these remedies are available in the South African 
Constitutional Court’s ‘toolbox’: With regard to the violation of the Bill of Rights, 
section 38 of the Constitution determines that courts must provide ‘appropriate relief, 
including a declaration of rights’ in such matters, while section 172 obliges courts to 
declare invalid any law or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution and also 
empowers them to provide any order that is ‘just and equitable’. These provisions thus 
give the Court a wide mandate when crafting a constitutional remedy, which would 
even allow the Court to design new remedies where necessary to ‘protect and enforce 
the Constitution.’318 Some guiding principles on how to make use of this mandate were 
set out by the Constitutional Court in the Fose case, dealing with the purpose of 
constitutional remedies.319 According to this judgement, the object of awarding a 
remedy is not merely to grant relief to the litigant before the court but also to vindicate 
the Constitution, and to deter its further infringement.320 Vindication is necessary 
because harm to constitutional rights, if not addressed, diminishes public’s faith in the 
Constitution. ‘The defence of the Constitution – its vindication – is a burden imposed 
not exclusively, but primarily on the judiciary.’321 It follows from this purpose of 
constitutional remedies that in general, they ‘are forward-looking, community-
oriented and structural rather than backward-looking, individualistic and corrective or 
retributive.'322 However, one important consideration for the Court in exercising its 
discretion is that the remedies it provides need to be effective.323 
Against this backdrop, the question arises, whether the Constitutional Court 
should rely on one of the two above mentioned “stronger” remedies in its socio-
economic rights adjudication in order to make the right of access to housing “real”. 
Regarding the possibility of an individualized enforcement first, instantly two 
objections spring to mind. Although individual relief is not necessary related to an 
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individual complaint mechanism – like the way it exists in Colombia or in Germany 
with a constitutional complaint allowing citizens relatively easy and inexpensive 
access to the Constitutional Court324 –, it seems to fit more naturally in the context of 
these instruments. The second, certainly more important objection is that the South 
African Constitutional Court in Grootboom expressly stated that section 26 of the 
Constitution, does not entitle any person to claim shelter or housing immediately upon 
demand325 and thus regularly does not entitle to any form of individual relief. The 
individual has a right, but only a right to demand that the state takes reasonable action 
in order to fulfil the right.326 Granting individual relief to the plaintiff is somehow 
diametral to this approach, because the state’s duty is not to immediately provide each 
and every person with housing, but rather to devise and implement a comprehensive 
and coordinated plan that will achieve this goal over time.327 Hence, it seems like the 
possibility of an individualised judicial enforcement of the right of access to housing 
is inextricably linked to the fact that the right confers a claim to the individual rights 
bearer.328 
However, as mentioned above, the Constitutional Court did not rule out the 
possibility that reasonableness – under certain conditions – could entitle the individual 
to at least some form of relief.329 Nevertheless, the granting of an individual remedy 
fits better to the minimum core concept, which entitles the individual to ‘having at 
least minimal shelter from the elements such that one’s health and thus one’s ability 
to survive are not compromised’330 and thus gives a claim. Surprisingly, the 
proponents of the minimum core concept – at least their most prominent representative 
David Bilchitz – do not draw the conclusion that the individual should always be 
entitled to individualised relief.331 Even if the courts find in favour of the individual 
because the state is in breach of its minimum core obligations, it should not in any 
case mean that the courts will grant an order requiring the government to provide the 
minimum core of the socio-economic right concerned to the individual.332 On the 
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contrary and quite similar to the reasonableness approach of the Constitutional Court, 
the minimum core concept should entitle to individual relief only under exceptional 
circumstances.333 To someone coming from a constitutional background like in 
Germany where all subjective public rights and especially the fundamental rights not 
only entitle to a claim, but also to individualised relief,334 this is quite remarkable. 
How is the minimum core concept supposed to ‘give socio-economic rights teeth’335 
if it does not entitle the plaintiff to individualised relief? Effectively, one could argue 
in the same way as the amici curiae in the TAC case that a right which eventually does 
not lead to individual relief for the plaintiffs is a ‘right to nothing at all’,336 irrespective 
if it’s content is defined by a minimum core or reasonableness. In this regard, it seems 
that even the proponents of the minimum core concept – despite of the special 
emphasis they put on the fact that the Bill of Rights does not distinguish between first 
and second-generation rights – give way to a different treatment of socio-economic 
rights. Even if rejected at the rights stage, there seems to exist a double standard in the 
treatment of socio-economic rights on the remedial level.337 After all, this seems like 
an evident acknowledgement of the limited resources of the state, which eventually 
leads to a different treatment of the right to access to housing and, for instance, the 
right of freedom of expression when it comes to the remedies. 
However, reverting back to the objectives of constitutional remedies under the 
South African Constitution, individualised enforcement does not seem to be the right 
path for the adjudication of the right of access to housing. As pointed out by the 
Constitutional Court, it is the painful reality that hundreds of thousands of people live 
in deplorable conditions throughout the country comparable to those of the community 
of Mrs. Grootboom.338 Due to that fact, the entitlement of individual relief would after 
all prioritise those individuals who are able and willing to bring their claims to court.339 
Although the Court clearly stated that in the Grootboom case there was no evidence 
whatsoever that the community of Mrs. Grootboom ‘moved out of the Wallacedene 
settlement and occupied the land earmarked for low-cost housing development as a 
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deliberate strategy to gain preference in allocation of housing resources’340, 
individualised relief might generally encourage such behaviour. By granting 
individual relief in socio-economic right cases, the courts would effectively reward 
“queue jumpers” and would render them better off than others facing the same 
situation. As a matter of fact, individualised enforcement of socio-economic rights 
thus tends to disproportionately benefit middle and upper-class groups rather than the 
poor341 and thus has a problematic equality-dimension. Moreover, if the courts make 
several separate orders which require the provision of access to housing to particular 
individuals, the government will be prevented from developing any coherent policy in 
regard of the provision of access to housing for the society as a whole.342 While 
individually considered the remedy might thus be effective, the enforcement of the 
right of access to housing in general will be worse off. Hence, individualised 
enforcement in general seems to be inappropriate for the adjudication of the right of 
access to housing under the South African Constitution. As the Constitutional Court 
rightly determined in Grootboom, only exceptional circumstances in a particular case 
could justify to grant individual relief to the plaintiff, for example, if the delayed relief 
would have a serious impact on the plaintiff.343 Given the fact that constitutional 
remedies should be ‘forward-looking, community-oriented and structural rather than 
backward-looking, individualistic and corrective or retributive'344, in any case, 
immediate individual relief for the litigants needs to be combined with a more general 
group-based and systematic remedy.345 
 Therefore, I will now turn to the other form of “strong enforcement”, the so called 
structural or supervisory remedies – where the court itself closely monitors and 
supervises the fulfilment of the right by the legislative and executive – in order to 
examine whether this form is better suited for the adjudication of the right of access to 
housing in the South African constitutional context.346 Whereas this remedy in regard 
of the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights is vividly discussed in 
academics,347 it has been barely practised by constitutional courts around the world 
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with the Indian Supreme Court being the only exception.348 The reason for that is 
twofold: First, it is contested whether constitutional courts possess the sufficient 
capacity to issue such an order as the supervision of a structural remedy is time-
consuming, expensive and certainly demands a tremendous amount of legal and 
political skills from the judiciary.349 This claim, no doubt, is valid, but it does not 
disqualify structural remedies in principle. How much of the court’s capacities will be 
tied up by monitoring government’s compliance with the constitutional requirements, 
will rather depend on the specific content of the structural order. Hence, the court itself 
can influence how time-consuming and expensive the supervision of the fulfilment of 
the judgement will be. However, in order to make the structural injunction effective, 
the frequency and the detail of the court’s supervision cannot be too lax. As a 
minimum requirement, the order needs to contain a concrete timeframe, making clear 
as to when the government needs to tackle the constitutional requirements elaborated 
in the respective judgment.350 
The second concern, which is somehow related to the first, is that the courts lack 
the legitimacy to issue a supervisory order. However, as mentioned above, sections 38 
and 172 of the Constitution empower a court to issue any order which is ‘just and 
equitable’ and thereby give the Court an extremely wide mandate when crafting a 
constitutional remedy. Hence, the Court is constitutionally mandated not only to 
identify the violation of a constitutional right but also to define the steps that must be 
implemented in order to cure this violation as long as the order leaves the responsible 
state agency the opportunity to choose the means of compliance.351 As the 
Constitutional Court itself stated in the TAC judgment: ‘Where a breach of any right 
has taken place, including a socio-economic right, a court is under a duty to ensure 
that effective relief is granted. […] Where necessary this may include […] the exercise 
                                                          
348 Supreme Court of India People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Others Writ petition 
no 196 of 2001 (May 8, 2002). See also the structural remedy of Davis J made in the High Court 
judgement in the Grootboom case. Grootboom and others v Oostenberg Municipality et al supra note 
7 at page 26-7. The High Courts of South Africa have actually granted supervisory orders in various 
cases. 
349 David Landau op cit note 152, 236. 
350 For the different forms of structural remedies see Christopher Mbazira op cit note 328, 176-92. 
351 Wim Trengove, ‘Judicial remedies for violations of socio-economic rights 1(4) (1999) Economic 
and Social Rights Review 9. 
54 
 
of supervisory jurisdiction.’352 Worries about the Constitutional Court’s legitimacy in 
regard of the possibilities to fashion a supervisory order are therefore misplaced.353 
When critics raise doubts doubts about the court’s institutional legitimacy, 
however, they do not only refer to the preservation of the separation of powers 
doctrine, but also to the preservation of the institutional independence of the 
Constitutional Court. This takes note of the fact that constitutional courts are political 
or strategic actors and operate in a political context which imposes significant 
constrains on their ability to adjudicate cases (only) according to law.354 As Theunis 
Roux has shown for the South African context, especially constitutional courts in a 
completely new established or even a young democracy find themselves in a very 
vulnerable position.355 In order to ensure their institutional independence and their 
continued existence, they can neither risk to place themselves in a direct collision 
course with the government nor to act completely against the public opinion.356 
However, considering the progressive way in which the South African Constitutional 
Court recently tries to ensure that the legislature retains some autonomy from the 
ANC’s internal decision-making bodies,357 it is safe to say that today the Court is 
beyond that stage and finds itself in a secured institutional position. There is no reason 
to assume that the Court would put its institutional position into jeopardy if it adjusted 
its socio-economic rights adjudication on the remedial stage by using structural 
remedies. As long as the Constitutional Court stays within its constitutional mandate 
and leaves the actual implementation of the judgment to the democratic process, it is 
capable to fashion a “strong” remedy and safeguard its own constitutional role at the 
same time. 
                                                          
352 TAC supra note 202 at para 106. 
353 David Bilchitz op cit note 21, 166. 
354 Theunis Roux op cit note 78, 397. See also Ran Hirschl & Evan Rosevear ‘Socio-economic rights 
and Political Realities’ in Tom Campbell & Keith Ewing & Adam Tomkins The Legal Protection of 
Human Rights. Sceptical Essays (2011) 207, 223-28. 
355 Theunis Roux op cit note 78, 105-8. 
356 A stroking example in this regard is the Hungarian Constitutional Court which put itself in the direct 
line of fire against the government through a very progressive social rights jurisprudence in the late 
1990s and is nowadays facing a lot of political pressure including a limitation of the Court’s jurisdiction. 
More instances of this kind of backlash are listed by Ran Hirschl & Evan Rosevear op cit note 354 at 
224-25. 
357 For example, Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; 
Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC); United 
Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2017 (5)  SA 300 (CC) and most 
recently Economic Freedom Fighters and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly and Another 
(CCT76/17) [2017] ZACC 47, where Mogoeng JC in his dissenting vote, however, is calling the 
majority judgement ‘a textbook case of judicial overreach’ (para. 223 of the judgement). 
55 
 
 The big advantage of a structural order is the Court’s retention of jurisdiction over 
the case even after the judgment has been passed, which makes it likely to be more 
effective than purely declaratory orders.358 Moreover, by asking the state to report 
back to the Court at a later stage, the Court could assist the government to comply with 
the requirements set out in the judgment. This should not encourage the Court to hand 
down a vague judgement in the first place, which only becomes concrete through the 
Court’s explanations during the implementation process.359 However, the continuous 
supervision of the Court provides for both parties the possibility of reassurance and 
clarification over the content of the judgement, which eventually could secure the 
complete and correct fulfilment of the order. When fashioning the structural order, the 
Court should, nevertheless, bear in mind its own institutional capacities and especially 
try to prevent to get involved in a protracted battle with the legislative and executive 
over the content of the judgement. As mentioned above, this will require a skilled and 
careful fashioning of the remedy.360 Despite these challenges, supervisory remedies 
should not be regarded as last resort when dealing with the violation of the right of 
access to housing. Because of the outlined advantages over a simple declaratory order, 
they should rather be applied on a regularly basis in order to make the judicial 
enforcement of the right more effective since the outcome of the declaratory order in 
Grootboom has been rather disappointing.361 Additionally, in cases where delayed 
systematic relief will have a serious impact on the plaintiffs, the structural order should 
be combined with some form of immediate and perhaps interim relief.362 
Unlike the judicial enforcement through a purely individualised approach, the 
enforcement of the right of access to housing through structural remedies does not 
equally depend on a steady stream of incoming cases. Their peculiar feature is rather 
– as mentioned above – that the Court retains jurisdiction over the case even after the 
judgment has been passed. However, it is still necessary that new cases reach the Court 
periodically to allow the Court the steady facilitation of the right through judicial 
review. In this regard, it is conspicuous that after Grootboom barley any other cases – 
where the positive dimension of the right had to be examined – came before the 
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Constitutional Court. In the cases where the positive dimension and the reasonableness 
approach played a role, it was always in the context of the violation of the negative 
side of the right of access to housing (section 26(3) of the Constitution) through 
upcoming evictions which invoked the question whether the state was obliged to 
provide alternative accommodation.363 The cases, however, did not deal directly with 
a state’s programme, or measures, to realise progressively the right of access to 
adequate housing.364 
According to David Bilchitz, the explanation for this lack of occurring cases in 
which the plaintiffs claim directly access to housing lies within the reasonableness 
approach.365 Its “amorphous standard”366, which does not prescribe any content to the 
right of access to housing, so the allegation, makes it particularly difficult for 
individual plaintiffs to claim their affirmative constitutional right of access to 
housing.367 However, the question is, whether the number of cases occurring before 
the Constitutional Court would be significantly higher, if the Court reverted to the 
minimum core concept as the standard of scrutiny since numerous other factors 
equally hinder broader access to the Court.368 Given South Africa’s courts structure 
where the Magistrates’ courts – although they are the closest to the people – do not 
have general jurisdiction over human rights cases, the cost of litigation, and the limited 
resources available to those who might bring cases dealing with the right of access to 
housing, it is more likely that an interplay of these factors places an obstacle in the 
way of ordinary citizens who wish to enforce their right of access to housing through 
litigation. 
For the Constitutional Court, however, it would be procedurally possible under 
section 167(6) of the Constitution to grant direct access and consequently spare the 
plaintiff to go through the multiple layers of appeal. Yet, so far, the Court has been 
very reserved in making use of the direct access mechanism, which would often be the 
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only way for poor people to benefit the justice system at all.369 In order to increase the 
low number of cases in which the positive dimension of the right of access to housing 
plays a role, the Court’s strict approach to applications for direct access thus needs to 
be eased to allow poor litigants to bypass expensive lower-court litigation 
processes.370 This does not mean that the Constitutional Court should concentrate on 
safeguarding individual justice in its jurisprudence, which would lie beyond its 
institutional capacities. However, by granting direct access to cases with principle 
structural importance, the Court could make the judicial enforcement of the right of 
access to housing more effective without changing its review standard.371 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Since Grootboom the reasonableness approach can be considered settled case-law 
when it comes to the enforcement of the positive duties imposed by the right of access 
to housing provided in section 26 and the other socio-economic rights provided in 
section 27 of the Constitution which are subject to ‘progressive realisation’ within the 
states ‘available resources’. Despite all the criticism against reasonableness and the 
strong promotion of the minimum core concept, it seems highly unlikely that the 
Constitutional Court will change its review standard any time soon even though South 
Africa ratified the ICESR in January 2015. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the 
right of access to housing is condemned to be effectively meaningless. As it has been 
shown – at least in the way applied in Grootboom and despite some conceptional 
shortcomings – the reasonableness approach protects those who are deprived of even 
a minimum essential level of housing. In this way, the reasonableness approach 
ensures respect for human dignity. Even the basic normative idea behind the 
formulation of a minimum core content that certain basic needs should enjoy 
preference over more advanced elements of the right to housing and should be 
addressed as a matter of urgency can be incorporated in the reasonableness approach 
as well. The reasonableness approach in itself is thus not only constitutionally 
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defensible but also bears the potential to make the right of access to housing “real” 
and effective for the individual. 
However, in order to realise its full potential, it is necessary that the Constitutional 
Courts adjusts its adjudication of the right of access to housing procedurally and on 
the remedial stage. Procedurally, the Court should mitigate its strict approach to 
applications for direct access to allow poor litigants to bypass expensive lower-court 
litigation processes. More access would bring more structural important cases before 
the Court and thus allow permanent judicial review of the government’s efforts to 
implement the right of access to housing. The progressive realisation of the right could 
also be monitored by using structural remedies, which would allow the Court to ensure 
the effectiveness of its once made decisions in a longer term. If crafted in a carefully 
manner, it seems highly unlikely that the Court, by using this form of “stronger” 
remedies, would risk its sustainable institutional role. In doing so, the Constitutional 
Court could reach a broader facilitation of the right of access to housing. However, the 
mere judicial enforcement itself will never be sufficient to provide the right of access 
to housing for the poor and disadvantaged if the political branches are at the same time 
unwilling to do so. Eventually it is up to the legislative and executive branches to live 
up to the transformative promise of the Constitution and to make the constitutional 
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